370

ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW
[Vol. 1:2 JOURNAL companies depends on predictions of high rates of return for these high risk investments. 5 The most robust of these predictions depend on the anticipated sale of the company within the next seven to ten years to the public, in an Initial Public Offering ("IPO"). 6 Since the number of IPOs has been down for the past several years, venture capital funding has been correspondingly flat. The fundamental reason for the small numbers of IPOs is, of course, the reluctance of public investors to buy IPO stock. The technology bubble burst in 2000 and investors still remember their losses in the IPO industries. But the IPO market would be more active if IPOs were not so expensive. They cost too much to do and, once done, a company has much higher ongoing costs. The higher ongoing costs are a significant bone of contention, particularly with the implementation of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.8 This paper, however, will focus on the costs of the IPO itself.
In the United States, a small company has to pay too much in fees and discounts when it sells its stock to the public. A small company selling fifty million dollars of its equity, as measured by the market price at the end of the first day, of an IPO with a market value of over fifty-three and a half HIGH COST OF IPOs DEPRESSES VENTURE CAPITAL million 9 can net only forty-five million dollars in cash or less, a seventeen percent or more charge.
1 0
More perversely, those who charge to do the IPOs, underwriters, are uninterested in the smaller offerings; underwriters do not make enough money on the small offerings to justify their expenditure of time on them. A small company that wants to raise twentyfive million dollars cannot find an underwriter; a fifty million dollar IPO is a practical minimum."
Lowering the cost of IPOs would not only enable small companies to net more money per offering, 12 it would also enable small companies to float smaller offerings. This comment briefly details the current regulation of IPOs, describes an alternative system of public offering that uses the Internet, and concludes with a discussion of whether there are regulatory problems with a system of Internet IPOs.
I. THE UNITED STATES IPO
9 Assuming an underpricing of approximately seven percent, see Table 1 , infra. '0 $53.5 million (value) -$3.5 million (underpricing, Table 1 , infra) -$5 million (estimated fees/expenses). ' GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (stating that businesses doing IPOs of less than $50 million have difficulty in attracting larger investment banking firms to underwrite the offerings, due to high fixed costs and economies of scale, and are distributed by lowertier investment banks that are less attractive to potential investors). 
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[Vol. 1: JOURNAL A small company undertaking an IPO in the United States will pay three percent or more of the size of the offering to lawyers, accountants and advisers. It will also pay the typical rate of seven percent, or more, for an underwriter. 17 Finally, the small company will watch as its stock trades at seven percent or more above the offering price on the first day (see Table 1 , below). 21 (2006) . The data cited in this study is derived from Oxera calculations based on the Bloomberg financial database.
The median first-day return on a NASDAQ IPO represents the middle-range in the amount by which the initial offering price of an IPO is less than the actual market value, signified by its return after the first day of trading. This "underpricing" may be a means by which underwriters generate investor interest by offering the stock at a price under its actual market value, which will help these initial investors realize a short-term gain from the resulting price increase in the secondary market. Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 724-25 (2005 19 This difference between a firm's gain from the sale and the actual market value of what was sold is significant when considering the future return promised to shareholders. Consider the difference between a promised return often percent on an IPO with a market capitalization of $50 million. After fees and expenses, the company's net gain would only be $45 million. With this reduced gain, the $5 million return promised to shareholders would require increasing the return from ten percent to eleven percent.
2
The high fees, the underwriting discount and the under-pricing of the shares are all due to the underwriting process mandated by existing SEC rules. The rules are well-known and deserve only a brief mention here.
SEC rules break down the underwriting process into three periods: the pre-filing period, the waiting period, and the post-effective period. The periods are defined by four dates. When a company is "in registration" (usually thirty days before the filing of a registration statement) and until it files a registration statement with the SEC, the company is in the pre-filing period and cannot make offers or sales of its securities. From the filing of the registration statement until the SEC declares the statement "to be effective," the company is in the waiting period and can make limited types of offers to sell but cannot close any sales. From the effective date until the end of the "distribution," the company is in the post-effective or distribution period and can sell the stock if it delivers a formal selling document, the final prospectus, to purchasers.
Most IPOs are conducted as firm commitment offerings.
2 0 A syndicate of investment banks underwrites the offering. 21 The syndicate purchases the entire allotment of new shares and resells them to the public during the distribution period. 22 One of the underwriters, the lead or bookrunning manager, will take the primary role in organizing the offering.
23
The night before the distribution period begins, the issuing company and the lead underwriter will agree on the public offering price, and the formal underwriting agreement that prices the shares will be executed the following morning. 24 The underwriter solicits views on price during the waiting period. Investors discount the price of the shares to reflect the higher valuation risk, reflecting the investment bank's lack of confidence in the securities.
It is within the SEC rules for companies to do a direct public IPO (or "DPO"), an offering by the company directly to the public without an underwriter.
37
Few are tried and many of those that are tried fail. 38 Investment banks argue that investors shy away from offerings that do not have the certification of an underwriter who has backed the offering with its reputation and exposure to liability for errant company claims. Moreover, those companies whose securities do not meet the listing requirements of a national securities exchange or the NASDAQ must register with all those states in which stock will be sold. 39 This can be a substantial burden for some DPOs. 40 Finally, the hostility of investment banks towards DPOs also affects the willingness of the major players in the investment community to invest robustly in DPOs; they cannot risk jeopardizing their ongoing business relationships with the banks. Thus, for most issuers, a DPO is currently only a financing option of last resort. Since established investment banks have not chosen to offer these DPO services, however, the reputation and the solvency of the DPO experts is not equal to traditional underwriters. 4 7 II. THE AIM The London Stock Exchange is successfully marketing a low cost public offering process to small companies, entitled the Alternative Investment Market ("AIM"). 48 The AIM caters to companies in the micro to small cap universe, 4 9 offering access and liquidity comparable to NASDAQ at a lower total cost to the issuer. 50 Small companies can raise capital on the AIM with fees and underwriting charges that are thirty percent of those incurred in the United States markets.
51
Under-pricing losses are less as well. 52 Smaller offerings with a consideration of less than 2.5 million Euros may also qualify for an exemption from filing a prospectus, further eliminating associated costs when compared to a listing on the NASDAQ. The AIM market has limited listing requirements. 55 There is no minimum share requirement, no trading record requirement, no shareholder approval requirement, and no minimum market capitalization requirement. 56
5,7
In addition to a working capital report, only two years of audits are required and a report on internal financial controls. A listed company must have a "nominated advisor" and declare its working capital.
58
The Nominated Advisor ("Nomad") vouches for the company, determining its suitability for AIM, and will do due diligence, but the requirements are less stringent than those for a full listing. 59 The Nomad's certification provides the substitute for the underwriter's certification in the United States.
Most of the AIM companies go public through a so-called private placement (it does not have the same meaning in the United States), in which a company's shares are offered to a select group of institutional investors that include well known names in the United States: Fidelity, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch. 6°T he AIM market is booming. In 2005, the AIM had three hundred and thirty-five IPOs compared to NASDAQ's thirty-five. 61 The deal size comparisons are also telling. The average technology IPO deal size on the
62
NASDAQ was $120 million, on the AIM it was $19 million. The AIM supported the smaller deals. AIM investors were willing to accept more risk, as the enterprise value was around six times revenue, as compared 63 with the NASDAQ's enterprise value of around five times revenue.
The London market has successfully created a public offering market for small and micro cap companies. To remain competitive, the United States trading markets need to mount a successful competitor to this market.
11
. WHAT COULD BE ... 55 The main component of the listing requirements is the admission document. Id. at 31, 
2006]
unacceptable investor speculation.
The first argument is the more serious of the two.
Small companies have been responsible for a large proportion of the instances of investor fraud.
67
By allowing small companies to make Internet offerings will we be giving the green light to the scam artists? No doubt more will try. Better investor education and stronger enforcement efforts should make the increase in fraud bearable, however. Moreover, the increase in fraud will be offset by the increase in legitimate business activity stimulated by the reduced costs of raising capital for many of our most innovative and productive companies.
I also suspect that our fear of scams is overblown, supported by those who stand to lose the most from the new IPO methods -investment banks. Investment banks, just as brokers did when fixed commissions were nixed, may find that new profitable opportunities have increased, not decreased, and that their old business for the larger companies survives and flourishes.
Investors will use the Internet offerings and the subsequent trading in the IPO stock as speculative opportunities. There can be no doubt. Day traders will plumb the new stocks for speculative gains. It is a better alternative to casino gambling. Gambling funds directed into stocks have a socially useful side (in addition to entertainment value); casino gambling does not. I would much rather have those in our casinos and sports betting parlors direct their money into the stock market than keep the funds where they are.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet has created an opportunity to allow our smaller companies to raise public capital in smaller amounts and at much lower Comments on Business Law Professor Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business law/2006/08/londons aim.html#comments (last visited Aug. 22, 2006) ("These [small and microcap firms] are much riskier companies reflected in the higher risk premium .... This, combined with minimal disclosure requirements and limited available research makes them ripe for manipulation and investor fraud. Not to mention higher failure naturally."); SEC, Pump&Dump.con: Tips for Avoiding Stock Scams on the Internet, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/pump.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (detailing the "pump-and-dump" scheme used by Internet defrauders). 66 See Sjostrom, supra note 24, at 582 ("Potential investors ... generally have no costeffect [sic] way to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the disclosure and assess the fairness of the offering."). 67 See ACSPC Final Report, supra note 15, at 139 (" [T]hese small firms consistently have more misstatements and restatements of financial information, nearly twice the rate of large firms .... Alarmingly, these small firms also make up the bulk of accounting fraud cases under review by regulators and the courts (one study puts it at 75 percent of the cases from 1998-2003).").
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[Vol. 1:2 JOURNAL cost. We should take advantage of the new technology and not let our fears of an unknown scam potential stymie our efforts.
